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ORPHAN WORKS AS GRIST FOR THE DATA MILL
Matthew Sag †

ABSTRACT
The phenomenon of library digitization in general, and the digitization of so-called
“orphan works” in particular, raises many important copyright law questions. However, as
this Article explains, correctly understood, there is no orphan works problem for certain
kinds of library digitization.
The distinction between expressive and non-expressive works is already well recognized
in copyright law as the gatekeeper to copyright protection—novels are protected by
copyright, while telephone books and other uncreative compilations of data are not. The
same distinction should generally be made in relation to potential acts of infringement.
Preserving the functional force of the idea-expression distinction in the digital context
requires that copying for purely non-expressive purposes (also referred to as nonconsumptive use), such as the automated extraction of data, should not be regarded as
infringing.
The non-expressive use of copyrighted works has tremendous potential social value by
making search engines possible, and by providing an important data source for research in
computational linguistics, automated translation, and natural language processing.
Furthermore, the macro-analysis of text is being increasingly used in fields such as the study
of literature itself. So long as digitization is confined to data processing applications that do
not result in infringing expressive or consumptive uses of individual works, there is no
orphan works problem because the exclusive rights of the copyright owner are limited to the
expressive elements of their works and the expressive uses of their works.

© 2012 Matthew Sag.
† Associate Professor of Law at Loyola University Chicago. Thanks to Pamela
Samuelson for encouraging me to pursue this line of inquiry. Thanks also to Jerome
Reichman, Matthew Jockers, and the participants at the 2012 Orphan Works and Mass
Digitization conference at U.C. Berkeley School of Law. Please address comments to
Matthewsag@gmail.com.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Modern technology makes it possible for libraries to scan their paper
collections and render them in digital form, making them more useful and
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more available than ever before. Modern copyright law ensures that this
scanning and digitization process is ensnared in a host of thorny issues.1
Library digitization2 has been rendered thornier still by Google’s bold entry
into the field in 2004, the ensuing litigation authors and publishers instigated,
and the audacity of the class action settlement negotiated in 2008 (and
revised in 2009) attempting to resolve that litigation.3
One of the main issues confronting libraries and others with respect to
digitization is whether and how to clear rights with respect to works whose
copyright owners are not easily found. The existence of these so-called
orphan works is one of the most vexing issues in U.S. copyright law today.4
One of the main benefits of the class action settlement proposed in relation
to Authors Guild v. Google was that it would have constituted an expeditious
resolution of the orphan works problem standing in the way of library
digitization.5 However, the treatment of orphan works proposed in the
settlement was also one of the primary reasons that the court ultimately
rejected it.6
This Article aims to untangle the orphan works thicket as it relates to
library digitization and show that, correctly understood, there is no orphan works
problem for certain kinds of library digitization. So long as digitization is confined
to data processing applications that do not result in infringing expressive or
1. There is a large literature on library digitization in general and the Google book
search litigation. See, e.g., Emily Anne Proskine, Google’s Technicolor Dreamcoat: A Copyright
Analysis of the Google Book Search Library Project, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 213 (2006); Jonathan
Band, The Long and Winding Road to the Google Books Settlement, 27 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 227 (2009); James Grimmelmann, D is For Digitize Symposium: An Introduction, 55
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 11, 12 (2010) (introducing the symposium issue of the New York Law
School Law Review on the Google Books lawsuit and settlement); Pamela Samuelson, The
Google Book Settlement as Copyright Reform, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 479 (2011).
2. Library digitization is the process whereby print-based library collections are
converted to digital form using scanning and optical character recognition.
3. Authors Guild et al. v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 669–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(reviewing procedural history and rejecting proposed settlement).
4. The U.S. Copyright Office defines “orphan works” as works that are subject to
copyright but whose copyright owners “cannot be identified and located by someone who
wishes to make use of the work in a manner that requires permission of the copyright
owner.” U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 1 (2006) available at
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf [hereinafter REPORT ON
ORPHAN WORKS].
5. Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 670 (noting that “Older books—particularly outof-print books, many of which are falling apart buried in library stacks—will be preserved
and given new life” (citing Matthew Sag, The Google Book Settlement & the Fair Use
Counterfactual, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 19, 73 (2010))).
6. Id. at 673–86 (rejecting proposed settlement under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure).
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consumptive uses of individual works, there is no orphan works problem.
This conclusion is supported by the fact that copyright owner’s exclusive
rights are generally limited to the expressive elements of their works and the
expressive uses of their works.7
II.

UNRAVELING THE DIGITIZATION DEBATE

Google entered the world of library digitization in 2004 when it began
scanning and digitizing the collections of a number of prestigious private and
public academic libraries to make their contents searchable in the same way it
makes Internet websites searchable. In many cases, Google also displayed
three-line “snippets” of the contents of those books to the general public—
just enough to indicate to the searcher whether the text was really responsive
to their search term.8 Google has been mired in copyright litigation regarding
its library digitization project since 2005 when the Authors Guild, along with
a group of publishers, sued Google in a class action on behalf of all authors.9
Google does not need permission to digitize works in the public domain and
the company has also obtained permission from several publishers to include
their works in the Google book search engine under agreed terms.10
However, the company is also digitizing millions of in-copyright works
without prior authorization from the relevant copyright owners, and therein
lays the core of the dispute.11
The first step towards unraveling the digitization debate is to distinguish
between different types of library digitization projects. Google’s aspirations
for book searches have shifted in a way that complicates the library
digitization debate. Initially, the Google Library Project (“GLP”) focused on
data processing and search; however, on October 28, 2008, Google, the
Authors Guild, and a group of leading publishers proposed a class action
settlement that, among other things, would have transformed the GLP into a

7. I first made this argument in an article addressing the significance of copy-reliant
technology more generally. This Article refines and extends my earlier analysis. See Matthew
Sag, Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1607 (2009).
8. Id. at 1620–22 (describing the operation of the Google book search engine).
9. Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 670.
10. Google’s Partner Program enables rights owners to opt into book search and
allows them to control how their works are searched and displayed. Google has signed up
over 20,000 rights holders to this Partner Program. See Information for Authors and Publishers,
GOOGLE BOOKS, http://www.google.com/googlebooks/publishers.html.
11. As of March 2011, Google had scanned at least twelve million books. See Authors
Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 670.
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general distribution platform for electronic versions of books.12 For the sake
of clarity, this Article will refer to the former as “GLP-search” and the latter
as “GLP-distribution.” The distinction is important because, although GLPsearch has a strong claim to legality under current U.S. copyright law, GLPdistribution does not.13
Looking beyond Google, it is useful to think of all library digitization
initiatives in three conceptually distinct genres corresponding to the three
objectives of library digitization: (1) preserving existing volumes (“library
digitization-preservation”); (2) facilitating data analysis and digital searching
(“library digitization-search”); and (3) facilitating access to electronic versions
of books (“library digitization-distribution”). The legal issues relating to each
of these genres must be considered separately.
A.

LIBRARY DIGITIZATION-PRESERVATION

Although libraries have certain privileges under the Copyright Act,
nothing in the statute expressly allows wholesale library digitization with the
exclusive aim of preserving existing volumes. Section 108 of the Copyright
Act allows libraries to reproduce and distribute works “for purposes of
preservation and security or for deposit for research use in another library”
or to replace copies that are “damaged, deteriorating, lost, or stolen,” or for
which the existing format has become obsolete.14 The scope of § 108 is very
narrowly tailored and the provision does not authorize a general digitization
program for preservation purposes.15 For example, § 108(b) allows a library
to make three copies of any unpublished work in its collection for
preservation and security purposes.16 Section 108(c) also permits a library to
12. Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Settlement Approval, Authors Guild v. Google
Inc., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 1159 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2008) (No. 05 Civ. 8136) [hereinafter Motion
for Preliminary Settlement Approval]. Settlement negotiations apparently began in the fall of
2006. In response to significant public criticism, including from the Department of Justice,
the parties proposed an Amended Settlement Agreement on November 13, 2009. Authors
Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 671–72.
13. See infra Section II.C.
14. 17 U.S.C. § 108(a)–(c) (2010).
15. See Lois F. Wasoff, If Mass Digitization Is the Problem, Is Legislation the Solution? Some
Practical Considerations Related to Copyright, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 731, 738 (2011). Wasoff
noted:
Current U.S. copyright law has no provision permitting libraries to make
preservation copies of published works. Preservation copies are limited to
unpublished works; replacement copies can be made of published works
if the work is damaged or lost, but only if an unused copy cannot be
located at a fair price.
Id.
16. 17 U.S.C. § 108(b).
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make three copies of published works to replace a work in the library’s
collection that is (or was) damaged, deteriorating, lost, or stolen—but only if
the library is unable to obtain a new copy at a fair price.17
The recommendations of the § 108 Study Group and the Copyright
Principles Project to expand and clarify the scope of § 108, with respect to
preservation, have much to recommend. However, the legal status of
digitization aimed solely at preservation is an issue at the periphery of the
debate.18 Even if library digitization-preservation were clearly protected under
the Copyright Act, there would still be considerable pressure to address the
issues of search and distribution.
B.

LIBRARY DIGITIZATION-DISTRIBUTION

In general, the digitization of library books to enable substantial display
and/or distribution of e-books clearly implicates the copyright owner’s
rights. To scan a book is to reproduce the work in a digital copy,19 and
substantial textual displays and distribution of further copies clearly have the
potential to substitute for the copyright owner’s authorized copies and would
not generally be protected by fair use. It is certainly arguable that fair use
would protect the display of works that are out-of-print and whose copyright
owner or owners cannot be located with reasonable efforts.20 But putting the
orphan works issue to one side for the time being, without additional facts,
there is nothing to indicate that merely making a work more available is a
transformative use that imbues the original “with a further purpose or
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or
message.”21 There may be specific instances where such display or
distribution would be justified as fair use, or would be protected by the § 108

17. 17 U.S.C. § 108(c). See also Laura N. Gasaway, Values Conflict in the Digital
Environment: Librarians Versus Copyright Holders, 24 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 115, 121–23 (2001);
Samuelson, Google Books, supra note 1.
18. SECTION 108 STUDY GROUP, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE SECTION 108 STUDY
GROUP REPORT iii–x (2008) (recommending numerous changes to library and archival
privilege), available at http://www.section108.gov/docs/Sec108StudyGroupReport.pdf; see
also Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1175 (2010) (recommending some updates to library and archival privilege).
19. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (providing that the copyright owner has the exclusive right to
reproduce the work in copies).
20. To expand upon my view of this issue would be distracting in the context of this
Article.
21. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
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library privilege or some other exception under the Copyright Act—but these
would be exceptions to the usual rule.22
Consider, for example, two features of the GLP provided for in the
Amended Settlement Agreement (“ASA”). Unless the rights holder opted
out, the ASA would have allowed Google to sell online access to entire
books as consumer purchases or “institutional subscriptions.”23 The ASA
also envisaged a default book display of up to 20% of a book, not just a
three-line snippet.24 Such extensive displays may well benefit copyright
owners by stimulating interest in the entire work, but they also potentially
substitute for the original works.25 The ASA would have allowed Google to
sell access to copyrighted works in a format and to an extent that substituted
for purchase of copyright owner authorized copies. Such an action is well
beyond the conceivable parameters of the idea-expression distinction or fair
use.26
To many, the legal obstacles confronting a full-fledged e-distribution
model of library digitization highlight the failure of the law to adapt to new
technology. GLP-distribution, as proposed under the ASA, has been
described as “one of the most important applications of digital information
technology in the information age.”27 Many out-of-print books are currently
available only to those with access to large research libraries. Furthermore,
library digitization has the potential to democratize access to these works and
create an important sphere of equality of opportunity. If digitization were
linked to some kind of payment mechanism it would help authors “breathe

22. A recent empirical study of fair use concludes that transformative use by the
defendant is a robust predictor of a finding of fair use; the amount and substantiality of the
defendant’s unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s work is a significant factor in litigated fair use
cases; but also notes that there is “no evidence that commercial use (in contrast to direct
commercial use) reduces the defendant’s chance of maintaining a fair use defense.” Matthew
Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 85 (2012).
23. Amended Settlement Agreement § 4.1, Authors Guild et al. v. Google Inc., 770 F.
Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 05 Civ. 8136) [hereinafter ASA].
24. Id. § 4.3(b)(1).
25. A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1018 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that
increased sales of copyrighted material attributable to unauthorized use should not deprive
the copyright holder of the right to license the material).
26. See Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 678 (“Google did not scan the books to make
them available for purchase, and, indeed, Google would have no colorable defense to a claim
of infringement based on the unauthorized copying and selling or other exploitation of
entire copyrighted books.”).
27. See Lateef Mtima & Steven D. Jamar, Fulfilling the Copyright Social Justice Promise:
Digitizing Textual Information, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 77, 104 (2010).
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new life into older, out-of-print books that are generally inaccessible to the
public and have stopped generating revenue.”28
Copyright law poses an obstacle to the electronic distribution of out-ofprint books because of the high costs of proactively clearing rights with
copyright owners. As time progresses, things like assignments, deaths,
bankruptcies, mergers, spin-offs, asset sales, reversion clauses in publishing
contracts, poor private record keeping, and poor public record keeping by
the Copyright Office can complicate the question of who owns the work.29
The more time elapses, the higher the likelihood that the public record no
longer provides enough information to know whom to ask for permission to
use the copyrighted material.30 Changes in copyright law over the years have
exacerbated this problem by making the vesting (and continuation) of
copyright automatic and by increasing the term of protection to the author’s
life plus seventy years, or ninety-five years from first publication for works
made for hire.31 To the extent that digitization is infringing, libraries and
technology developers cannot afford to ignore the fact that these works may
be subject to copyright because, even in the absence of actual harm or
malicious intent, copyright owners may recover both statutory damages (up
to $150,000 per work infringed) and attorney’s fees.32
The scale of the orphan works issue is potentially vast. One estimate
finds that only 2.3% of books published in the United States between 1927
and 1946 are still in print.33 Another reports that five out of every seven
books Google scanned were not commercially available.34 The Authors Guild
estimates that approximately 75% of books in U.S. libraries are out-of-print
and have ceased earning any income at all for their rights holders.35 As the
28.
29.
30.
31.

Motion for Preliminary Settlement Approval, supra note 12, at 4.
See generally REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 4, at 23–29.
Id. at 26–29.
17 U.S.C. § 302(b)–(c) (2010). As Pamela Samuelson notes:
Had copyright terms not been repeatedly extended by Congress, all books
published before 1953 would now be in the public domain, as would most
of the books published before 1978 insofar as their rights holders did not
renew the copyright. Because of copyright term extensions, books first
published in 1960 are, however, unlikely to be out of copyright until 2055.
Pamela Samuelson, Google Book Search and the Future of Books in Cyberspace, 94 MINN. L. REV.
1308, 1313 (2010); see also Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright Law, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 485 (2004); see generally REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 4, at 41–44.
32. 17 U.S.C. §§ 504(c) (statutory damages), 505 (attorney’s fees).
33. See Jason Schultz, The Myth of the 1976 Copyright “Chaos” Theory, LESSIG 2.0,
http://www.lessig.org/blog/archives/jasonfinal.pdf (last visited June 14, 2012).
34. See Motoko Rich, Google Hopes to Open a Trove of Little-Seen Books, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5,
2009, at B1.
35. Motion for Preliminary Settlement Approval, supra note 12, at 27.
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Copyright Office report on orphan works notes, this problem is particularly
severe for institutions, such as libraries and museums, whose mission is to
preserve and make available large archives of historical works.36
To the extent that rights clearance is truly uneconomic, copyright is
failing both orphan works owners and the public at large. Copyright exists to
enable authors to set a price on access, not to frustrate access for its own
sake. Library digitization’s enormous potential (whether it be economic,
educational, social, or democratic), and the copyright law’s current failure in
relation to orphan works, have led to many proposals for reform.37
C.

LIBRARY DIGITIZATION-SEARCH

The GLP version proposed under the ASA requires either judicial
approval of the ASA (which will not be forthcoming) or legislative
intervention. But what if Google were to scale back its ambitions to its initial
proposal where unauthorized digitization was only incident to search? In the
pure search scenario, the legality question of library digitization initiatives
takes on a different complexion. Stated briefly, the argument favoring the
legality of scanning, processing, and making fractional displays of books
involved in GLP-search has three significant parts.
First, search results consisting of bibliographic information and relevance
to a particular search query are facts not subject to copyright protection.38
This is textbook copyright law in the United States and beyond serious
dispute.39
Second, the very brief snippets or quotations that Google displays in its
search results are either (a) too brief, fragmented, and insubstantial to
constitute a reproduction of an entire copyrighted work40 or (b) used in a
transformative manor to indicate the relevance of search results and not to
substitute for the actual text, as such these snippets serve a different function

36. REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 4, at 37–38.
37. See, e.g., Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, S. 2913, 110th Cong. (2008).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (providing that “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such a work”). See also Feist Publ’g, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363–64 (1991) (noting that copyright distinguishes between facts
and their expression).
39. See infra Section III.A for further discussion of the idea-expression distinction.
40. Even if one took the view that Google’s actual three line snippets were too long,
there must be some length of snippet—whether it be three lines, two lines, one line, or ten
words—that would be non-infringing.
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than the original work and are thus fair use.41 Either conclusion renders the
search results displayed in GLP-search non-infringing. However, even if
Google never showed a single book to anyone, the fact remains that it has
been technically copying entire works to create its searchable database.
Third, copying entire expressive works for non-expressive (and otherwise
non-infringing) purposes is itself fair use.42 Notice here that although orphan
works may raise distinct issues in some contexts, the legitimacy of scanning
and digitizing orphan works for library digitization-search is largely folded
into the broader question of the scope of the copyright owner’s rights in
relation to non-expressive use. However, we should not lose sight of the
importance of orphan works to the underlying policy debate. The intractable
licensing problems that create orphan works mean extending the rights of
copyright owners to include non-expressive use that would create a
substantial market failure. Going forward, it is conceivable that publishers
will get the rights they need from authors and agree to license these rights to
those seeking to make non-expressive use of covered works, but, for the
reasons canvassed above, the rights with respect to the majority of orphan
works held in libraries will never be cleared. Put simply, if a court establishes
a new right that gives copyright owners a veto over non-expressive use of
their works, those rights will never be cleared for millions of orphan works.
III.

NON-EXPRESSIVE USE

A.

COPYRIGHT, BALANCE, AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN IDEAS
AND EXPRESSION

As expressed in the U.S. Constitution, copyright’s motivating purpose is
“to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”43 Copyright law in the
United States does not exist primarily to recognize or validate the natural
rights of authors vis-à-vis their creations. Instead, its purpose is to encourage
the authors’ creativity and to promote the creation and dissemination of

41. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that “[e]ven making an exact copy of a work may be transformative so long as the
copy serves a different function than the original work.”) (citing Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,
336 F.3d 811, 818–19 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley
Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609–10 (2d Cir. 2006); Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1117–
19 (D. Nev. 2006).
42. There are at least three search engine cases indicating as much. See Perfect 10, 508
F.3d at 1167–68; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 815; Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1117–19. For a discussion of
the fair use implications of non-expressive use generally, see Matthew Sag, Copy-Reliant
Technology, supra note 7.
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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works of authorship.44 As the Supreme Court has noted on a number of
occasions, the promotion of science and the useful arts requires a balance
between “the interests of authors and inventors in the control and
exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society’s
competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information and commerce on
the other hand.”45 Where the law strikes that balance dictates what the public
can copy and what authors can control. Just as importantly, it also mediates
relationships between different generations of authors: initial authors and
those who build upon their works.46 Thus, while copyright aims to give
authors an incentive to create and share their works, it also strives to provide
subsequent authors with sufficient “breathing room” to make their own
additive contributions.47 The copyright system is predicated both on the
existence of certain rights to protect authors from unfair competition, and on
significant gaps in those rights that give others freedom to create and
freedom to interact with existing works.
The distinction between ideas and expression is an important part of the
balance of copyright law.48 Copyright in an expressive work does not confer
any exclusive rights in the facts, ideas, concepts, or discoveries contained in
that work, regardless of the form in which the work describes, explains, or
illustrates them.49 This principle, often simply abbreviated to the “idea-

44. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
45. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 580 (1985)
(quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).
46. See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law,
75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997) (discussing sequential innovation in copyright and patent law).
47. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 933
(2005). The court in Sony noted:
The fair use doctrine must strike a balance between the dual risks created
by the copyright system: on the one hand, that depriving authors of their
monopoly will reduce their incentive to create, and, on the other, that
granting authors a complete monopoly will reduce the creative ability of
others.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 479.
48. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (stressing that the idea-expression distinction is one of
copyright’s “built-in First Amendment accommodations” and that “[d]ue to this distinction,
every idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted work becomes instantly available for public
exploitation at the moment of publication.”); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556 (noting that the
idea-expression distinction “strikes a definitional balance between the First Amendment and
the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an
author’s expression.”).
49. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2010); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547 (1985) (holding that “no
author may copyright facts or ideas”).
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expression distinction,” is longstanding at common law and was expressly
incorporated into the 1976 revision of the Copyright Act.50
At least since Baker v. Selden in 1879, courts have recognized that “there is
a clear distinction between the book, as such, and the art that it is intended to
illustrate.”51 The distinction holds even in those unusual cases where the
work’s true value lies in the methods, systems, and ideas it discloses, rather
than in the author’s expression of those concepts.52 In Selden, for example,
the plaintiff had developed a novel and useful bookkeeping method, the
practice that created value regardless of how and from what source a
bookkeeper learned the method.53 Nonetheless, the plaintiff’s copyright in
his instructional material was limited to the expression of his useful methods
and did not encompass those methods themselves.54 Of course, in most
cases, protecting the unique expression of an idea is sufficient to ensure that
the author will be able to appropriate a return on her investment.55
Copyright law also distinguishes between facts and the expression of
facts, providing no protection for the former and only limited protection for
the latter.56 In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., the Supreme
Court ruled that copying listings from a telephone directory did not infringe
the copyright in that directory because the information itself was not
copyrightable.57 As the Court explained, facts—whether they are telephone
numbers and addresses or the details of historical occurrences—are not
50. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) provides: “In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such a work.”
51. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879). “Art” and “illustrate” are not meant in the
aesthetic sense in this context.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 99–100. Selden’s system may well have been patentable under today’s
standards. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that a patent on a data processing system is valid). But see Lab.
Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 136 (2006) (per curiam)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme Court has never endorsed the Federal
Circuit’s “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test for patentable processes). See generally
Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the Scope of Its
Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1924 (2007) (arguing that thin copyright protection for
computer programs is especially appropriate given the availability of patent protection for
program innovations).
54. Baker, 101 U.S. at 103–04.
55. Cf. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 91–108 (2003).
56. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) (holding
that facts are not copyrightable and that the copyright in a factual compilation is thin).
57. Id. at 362–63.
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“original” to the author.58 The author’s copyright, therefore, did not cover
the facts themselves.59 The Feist Court further held that the expression of
those facts was not protectable, because the selection and alphabetical
arrangement of those facts in the telephone directory was “so mechanical or
routine as to require no creativity whatsoever.”60 The rule in Feist even
extends to “false facts.”61
Through the idea-expression distinction, copyright law protects the
expressive elements of the author’s work while guaranteeing subsequent
authors the necessary breathing space to make their own contributions by
adding to, reusing, or reinterpreting the facts and ideas embodied in the
original work. Subsequent authors may not compete with the copyright
owner by offering her original expression to the public as a substitute for the
copyright owner’s work, but they are free to compete with their own
expression of the same facts, concepts, and ideas. Thus, the idea-expression
distinction is a central element of the balance between the interests of
authors in preventing the exploitation of their writings and society’s
competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce.62
Demarcating the precise boundary between ideas and expression is no
easy task. The famous 1930 case of Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. dealt with
a play about lovers from different religious backgrounds and a motion
picture with the same motif.63 The playwright, whose work came first, alleged
58. Id. at 348 (“[C]opyright protection may extend only to those components of a work
that are original to the author.”).
59. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556 (“No author may copyright his ideas or the facts he
narrates.”).
60. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 362 (holding that the selection, coordination, and arrangement
of Rural’s white pages did not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for copyright
protection); see also Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674, 676 (2d Cir.
1998) (holding that West’s factual enhancements to judicial opinions could be reasonably
viewed as obvious, typical, and lacking even minimal creativity).
61. False facts are denied protection under a theory of “copyright estoppel.” SkinderStrauss Assocs. v. Mass. Continuing Legal Educ., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 665, 675–76 (D. Mass.
1995); Houts v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 26, 28 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (“once a
plaintiff’s work has been held out to the public as factual the author-plaintiff cannot then
claim that the book is, in actuality, f iction and thus entitled to the higher protection allowed
to fictional works.”). Some courts have been willing to grant de facto database protection to
individual facts brought into being as a result of creative choices, such as bluebook
valuations, and price guides to rare coins. See, e.g., CDN, Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256 (9th
Cir. 1999).
62. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); see also
Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983) (describing the ideaexpression distinction as “an effort to enable courts to adjust the tension between these
competing effects of copyright protection”).
63. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 120–21 (2d Cir. 1930).
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that the movie infringed his rights.64 Ruling for the defendant, Judge Learned
Hand observed that although copyright must extend beyond the exact literal
text of a work, similarities between two works at a high level of generality
cannot violate the author’s rights because a playwright can not “prevent the
use of his ‘ideas,’ . . . apart from their expression . . . .”65 Having described
the idea-expression distinction, the learned judge immediately observed that
“[n]obody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.”66
Although the precise point of departure between protectable expression on
the one hand and unprotectable fact and ideas on the other may be elusive,67
unstable68 and somewhat subjective,69 no one doubts that it exists.70
The distinction between expressive and non-expressive works is already
well recognized in copyright law as the gatekeeper to copyright protection—
novels are protected by copyright, telephone books and other uncreative
compilations of data are not.71 The position of this Article is that the same
distinction should generally be made in relation to potential acts of
infringement. Preserving the functional force of the idea-expression
distinction in the digital context requires courts to conclude that copying for
purely non-expressive purposes, such as the automated data extraction,
should not be regarded as infringing. As this Article will explain in Section
III.C, infra, courts are already tacitly implementing the principle of nonexpressive use in the case law. The principle, however, needs to be brought
to the surface.

64. Id.
65. Id. at 121.
66. Id. See also Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d
Cir. 1960) (“Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond
copying the ‘idea,’ and has borrowed its ‘expression.’ Decisions must therefore inevitably be
ad hoc.”).
67. Professor Chafee’s proposed “pattern” test for determining the line between an
idea and its expression is as good as any, but it essentially reframes the question rather than
answering it. Zechariah Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503,
513–14 (1945).
68. See, e.g., Peter Jaszi, The Metamorphoses Of “Authorship,” 41 DUKE L.J. 455, 465 (1991).
69. See Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-Expression
Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgments, 66 IND. L.J. 175, 228 (1990) (reviewing
the application of the idea-expression distinction in case law and concluding that where the
line is drawn “reflects the judge’s view of the artistic value of the works at issue based on
what the judge knows about and values in literary works on that subject.”).
70. But see Edward C. Wilde, Replacing the Idea/Expression Metaphor With a Market-Based
Analysis in Copyright Infringement Actions, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 793 (1995).
71. Feist Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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NON-EXPRESSIVE USE
1. Coming to Grips with the Concept of Non-Expressive Use

To understand what non-expressive use means, consider the following
thought experiment.
Brian has a perfect memory for the written word: he can recite every
book he has ever read perfectly from start to finish. He can, if pushed, write
out frequency tables that report the number of times any given word or
punctuation mark appears in any work.72 Brian might, for example, produce
the following word frequency graphs for Herman Melville’s Moby Dick.
Figure 1 illustrates the frequency of common English words in Moby Dick
based on a list of words that is not sensitive to context such as “the,” “of,”
“and,” “have,” etc. Figure 2 illustrates word frequencies in Moby Dick once
the words in Figure 1 have been excluded.
Figure 1: Frequency of Common English Words in Moby Dick73

72. ALEKSANDR ROMANOVICH LURIA, THE MIND OF A MNEMONIST: A LITTLE BOOK
ABOUT A VAST MEMORY (1987) (an account of a Russian man with a limitless memory).
73. H ERMAN M ELVILLE , M OBY D ICK ; OR , THE W HALE , available at

http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/moby/moby.html. Word frequency obtained using
Wordle.net java applet. WORDLE, http://www.wordle.net/(java applet for obtaining word
frequency). Words selected by the author.
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Figure 2: Frequency of Selected Words in Moby Dick74

The same information can be represented in a more whimsical visual
style using a word cloud as follows in Figure 3 and Figure 4.

74. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK; OR, THE WHALE, available at
http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/moby/moby.html. Word frequency obtained using
Wordle.net java applet. WORDLE, http://www.wordle.net/ Words selected by the author.
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Figure 3: Moby Dick Word Cloud (Common)75

Figure 4: Moby Dick Word Cloud (Uncommon)76

Assume for the moment that Moby Dick is still protected by copyright.77
If Brian were to simply transcribe the novel and sell his transcription in
bookstores or on street corners, he would undoubtedly infringe the author’s
75. H ERMAN M ELVILLE , M OBY D ICK ; OR , THE W HALE , available at
http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/moby/moby.html. Word cloud produced using
Wordle.net. WORDLE, http://www.wordle.net/.
76. H ERMAN M ELVILLE , M OBY D ICK ; OR , THE W HALE , available at
http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/moby/moby.html. Word cloud produced using
Wordle.net. WORDLE, http://www.wordle.net/. Words selected by the author.
77. First published in 1851, Moby Dick is no longer protected by copyright.
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copyright.78 But would the frequency table infringe the author’s copyright?
The frequency table itself is metadata, data about the work that is entirely
independent of the expressive value of the work. True enough, the data relies
on the underlying work, but it has no similarity to the work in terms of plot,
structure, character (other than the names of characters) or theme. This data,
by itself, does not infringe the copyright owner’s rights.
Is there a point at which an analytical work explains so much of the
content of its expressive subject that the author’s rights have been infringed?
Perhaps. In Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc.,79 the
Second Circuit held that a quiz book based on the characters and events of
the popular television series Seinfeld violated the show’s copyright. The court
acknowledged that the substantially similar standard depends on “the
copying of expression, rather than ideas” and that the quiz reproduced none
of the plot, sequence, pace, or setting of the show.80 The defendant’s quiz
focused on “facts” internal to the Seinfeld universe, such as the reason that
Kramer enjoys going to the airport (because he is hypnotized by the baggage
carousels) or what it was that Jerry placed on Elaine’s leg during a piano
recital (a Pez dispenser), and not facts about the show.81 The court of appeals
took the view that “[b]ecause these characters and events spring from the
imagination of Seinfeld’s authors, the [quiz] plainly copies copyrightable,
creative expression.”82 Of course, the court cannot really mean that any work
that refers to the characters and events in a creative work is infringing.
Furthermore, there are volumes of guide-books and analytical works that do
not interfere with the copyright owner’s exclusive rights, and it is well
established that “ownership of copyright does not confer a legal right to
control public evaluation of the copyrighted work.”83 The real problem with
the defendant’s quiz in Castle Rock Entertainment was that it sought to
“repackage Seinfeld to entertain Seinfeld viewers” and that the quiz itself was in
no way analytical.84 If the Seinfeld quiz infringed the copyright owner’s rights
at all, it was because it essentially recast the series’ copyrightable characters

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (reproduction), (3) (distribution).
150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
Id. at 138.
Id. at 139.
Id.
Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l. Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 521 (7th Cir. 2002).
Castle Rock Entertainment, 150 F.3d at 140–43.
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into a new format, much the same as if the defendant had made miniature
dolls of the show’s characters.85
The recent Harry Potter Lexicon case is also on point.86 In Warner Brothers
Entertainment Inc. v. RDR Books, the court found that a guidebook to the
famed Harry Potter series violated the author’s copyright.87 The court found
that the Lexicon was substantially comprised of direct quotations (often
without quotation marks) and close paraphrases of vivid passages in the
Harry Potter books.88 Like the Seinfeld quiz, the Lexicon related “fictional
facts” the author, J.K. Rowling, had created. In line with Castle Rock, the
court concluded “such invented facts constitute creative expression protected
by copyright because characters and events spring from the imagination of
the original authors.”89 One interpretation of the court’s opinion in the Harry
Potter Lexicon case is that if the guidebook had not borrowed so extensively
from the original author’s expression, it would not have been found to
infringe.90 The Lexicon’s purpose was to “give the reader a ready
understanding of individual elements in the elaborate world of Harry Potter
that appear in voluminous and diverse sources.”91 The district court in the
Harry Potter Lexicon case held that the Lexicon did not infringe the copyright
owner’s right to make derivative works because it no longer represented the
original work of authorship and did not fall under any example of derivative
works listed in the statute.92 The court followed the Seventh Circuit’s holding
that a collector’s guide to stuffed toys is not a derivative work because
“guides don’t recast, transform, or adapt the things to which they are
guides.”93 If the Lexicon had been drafted with more care, it need not have
infringed the copyright owner’s rights.
85. See, e.g., Hasbro Bradley, Inc. v. Sparkle Toys, Inc., 780 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1985)
(upholding copyrightability of “Transformer” changeable robotic action figures as sculptural
works).
86. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 527 (“the Lexicon indeed contains at least a troubling amount of direct
quotation or close paraphrasing of Rowling’s original language”); id. at 530 (“The Lexicon’s
close paraphrasing is not limited to the seven Harry Potter novels, but can be found in entries
drawn from the companion books as well.”); id. at 531 (“Instances of such verbatim copying
or close paraphrasing of language in the Harry Potter works occur throughout the Lexicon.”).
89. Id. at 536 (citations and quotations omitted).
90. The decision could be clearer as to the relationship between findings of fact and
legal conclusions.
91. Id. at 539.
92. Warner Bros., 585 F. Supp. 2d at 539 (“Under these circumstances, and because the
Lexicon does not fall under any example of derivative works listed in the statute, Plaintiffs
have failed to show that the Lexicon is a derivative work.”).
93. Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l. Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 520 (7th Cir. 2002).
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The automated data analysis of text that this Article addresses is a far cry
from the fragmented expression copying in the Harry Potter Lexicon case and
other similar “fictional facts” cases. Copyright does not protect individual
words, even in the rare instances where they are in fact a creation of the
author.94 For example, an author such as J.K. Rowling can be said to
originate the following twenty-word string of text: “[g]oblin-made armour
does not require cleaning, simple girl. Goblins’ silver repels mundane dirt,
imbibing only that which strengthens it.”95 But none of these individual
words originates with Rowling. The corresponding entry in the Lexicon reads
“[a]ccording to Phineas Nigellus, goblin-made armor does not require
cleaning, because goblins’ silver repels mundane dirt, imbibing only that
which strengthens it, such as basilisk venom.”96 Moreover, the observation
that no word other than “goblin” is repeated in either sentence originates,
not with Rowling, but with the author of this Article.97 Likewise, if some antiplagiarism software were to identify a high level of similarity between the two
quotes—as it surely would—that data could not be said to originate with
either the author of Harry Potter or the author of the Lexicon. It is a fact
about the works and is in no sense a reproduction of either work or a
substantial part of the original expression therein. In summary, metadata of
the sort described here infringes only as much as a landscape painting
inspired by a novel, or a musical composition inspired by a film would—i.e.,
not at all.98
Returning to our thought experiment, would Brian infringe the copyright
owners rights by simply memorizing Moby Dick as part of the process of
making the table? If Brian is a human being, it seems absurd to suggest that
the perfect storage of information in his brain violates the copyright owner’s
exclusive right to “reproduce the work in copies . . .” under § 106(1) of the
Copyright Act. Even if scientists told us that Brian’s brain stored and could
recall the information with perfect accuracy,99 it is inconceivable that human
94. The Copyright Office has a long-standing rule that “words and short phrases such
as names, titles, and slogans” are not copyrightable. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2004). See Justin
Hughes, Size Matters (Or Should) In Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 575 (2005).
95. Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 527 (quoting J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND
THE DEATHLY HALLOWS 303 (2007)).
96. Id.
97. Admittedly, this is not a profound observation.
98. See Robert Kastenmeier, Copyright Law Revision, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 (2d sess.
1976) (noting a programmatic musical composition inspired by a novel).
99. Looking closely at the definition of copies in § 101 of the Act it is not immediately
clear that the human brain cannot be a copy. To amount to a copy under the Act, the
medium storage must simply be a “material object . . . in which a work is fixed . . . and from
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
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thought or human memory could be a form of copyright infringement.100
Now suppose that Brian is a computer; should the answer really be any
different?
2. Examples of the Non-Expressive Use of Expressive Works
Ordinarily, the direct or indirect purpose of reproducing an expressive
work relates to human appreciation of the expressive qualities of that work.
We might, for example, download a film to watch it, or photocopy a
magazine article to read it. The examples that follow illustrate a very different
kind of motivation for copying text: reproduction as part of a process of data
analysis that does not enable human enjoyment, appreciation, or
comprehension of the text. These examples demonstrate the utility of
automated non-expressive uses. They also demonstrate that such uses are no
threat to the interests of copyright owners. This Section begins with two of
the more obvious examples unrelated to library digitization—Internet search
engines and plagiarism detection software—before turning to the role of
non-expressive use in library digitization.
a) Internet Search Engines101
Internet search engines provide the most obvious example of the
importance of the non-expressive use of copyrighted works. Internet search
engines are a form of copy-reliant technology in that they require the routine
and indiscriminate copying of html web pages.102 Search engines use
automated software agents that continuously “crawl” across the Internet
copying web pages. These copies form the raw data underpinning these
with the aid of a machine or device.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010). Most people’s brains do not
store information with the stability and fidelity required to meet this definition, but what of
those that do? One answer is to posit, as David Nimmer has in relation to tattoos, that a
human is not a “material object,” and while this may be a sound policy-based exclusion, it
does not supply its own rationalization. See Declaration of David Nimmer, Whitmill v.
Warner Bros. Entm’t, No. 4:11CV752 (E.D. Mo. May 20, 2011) (declaration in support of
the defendant in copyright litigation regarding the use of Mike Tyson’s facial tattoo in the
motion picture THE HANGOVER II (Warner Brothers 2011)).
100. Likewise in patent law, “[a] principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an
original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an
exclusive right.” Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1853); Mayo Collaborative
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (noting that natural phenomena,
mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable). See generally Kevin
Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60 SMU L. REV. 317 (2007).
101. See Sag, Copy-Reliant Technology, supra note 7 for a more detailed account the
operation of Internet search engines and plagiarism detection software.
102. Sergey Brin & Lawrence Page, The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search
Engine, 30 COMPUTER NETWORKS AND ISDN SYS. 107 (1998), available at http://infolab.
stanford.edu/~backrub/google.html.
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search engines, which are subsequently analyzed and cataloged. As part of
this process, search engines both copy and index each web page they find.
The search engine directs the user to particular websites based on the
relationship of her search term to the index of pages maintained by the
search engine provider.103 The search engine’s use is non-expressive because
the software copies expressive works in order to apply certain mathematical
functions to their contents, not to comprehend or enjoy copyrighted works
in the way that humans do. Of course, at the end of the day, search engines
are mostly useful because they lead people to particular websites. But the
search engine itself does not copy the website for the end user. Instead, this
process is performed separately by the user’s browser at the direction of the
user.104
b) Plagiarism Detection Software
Plagiarism detection software is another illustration of the copying of
expressive works for non-expressive ends. In the educational context,
automated plagiarism services rely on access to entire copies of student term
papers and any works from which a student might have copied them, yet the
services do not necessarily display any of the copyrighted content they
process to the end users.105 The software works by comparing strings of text
in new works to strings of text in existing works.106 The similarities between
two works can be assessed by looking for common strings of words.
However, there are also various algorithms that can be applied to a document
to create a digital fingerprint that captures other characteristics of the work.
These digital fingerprints allow a document to be characterized by its
structure, vocabulary, and content. Furthermore, they are essentially
abstractions of the original documents and allow for faster comparisons that
will not be as easily deceived by minor text alterations.107 If the software finds
103. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,285,999 (filed Jan. 9, 1998) (“Method for Node Ranking
in a Linked Database”).
104. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1161 (2007).
105. See Sag, Copy-Reliant Technology, supra note 7 for a more detailed account the
operation of Internet search engines and plagiarism detection software.
106. See Amy Argetsinger, Technology Snares Cheaters at U-Va.; Physics Professor’s Computer
Search Triggers Investigation of 122 Students, WASH. POST, May 9, 2001, at A1.
107. See, e.g., Khair Eddin M. Sabri & Jubair J. Al-Ja’afer, The JK System to Detect Plagiarism,
6(2) J. COMPUTER SCI. & TECH. 66 (2006). The Turnitin software at issue in A.V. ex rel.
Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009) used statistical techniques
originally designed to analyze brain waves to compare the fingerprints of student papers to
more than a billion documents that have been fingerprinted in a similar fashion. See Plagiarise.
Let No One Else’s Work Evade Your Eyes, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 2002, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/1033832.
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a match, it indicates as much. By itself, the report that a new work is similar
to another work already in the database in no way reproduces or
communicates the expressive qualities of either work.108
c) Non-Expressive Use and Library Digitization
Library digitization raises many novel issues, but one should not lose
sight of the fact that some of the relevant issues are not at all new. The
fundamental issue with respect to the legality of copying to build a search
engine is the same for web pages as it is for library books. In point of fact,
there are some interesting differences. To start, library digitization also raises
interesting questions about the scope of the § 108 library privilege.109 Nonprofit libraries that undertake digitization initiatives might have additional
arguments to make with respect to fair use. Likewise, the automated copying
of html pages may also be protected by an implied license in many cases.110
But these are distractions; the key question remains whether automated and
systematic copying of text to enable a search engine (but not a display
engine) or other data-processing function violates the rights of the copyright
owner.
In addition to book searches, there are many non-expressive uses for
library digitization. Researchers could use a digitized collective (referred to in
the trade as the “corpus”) to test and refine search algorithms more
generally.111 Other researchers could use the resulting data field to improve
automated translation software and to develop and test theories in linguistics.
Some of the most interesting illustrations of the kind of non-expressive use
that library digitization enables relate to the meta-analysis of literature.
In the world of books, a non-expressive use is any use that, while it may
literately involve reproduction of the work, does not involve any human
108. Of course, in practice most plagiarism software is also programmed to display the
source file from which the work being scrutinized was allegedly copied. This optional feature
is an expressive use, although it is almost certainly protected by fair use because the purpose
of the display is to provide evidence of a claim of cheating. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye, 562 F.3d
at 641–42 (finding that the defendant’s use of the works as part of a digitized database from
which to compare the similarity of typewritten characters used in other student works was
unrelated to any creative component of the work).
109. See, e.g., Peter B. Hirtle, Digital Access to Archival Works: Could 108(b) Be the Solution?,
COPYRIGHT & FAIR USE: STANFORD UNIV. LIBRARIES (Sept. 24, 2006),
http://fairuse.stanford.edu/commentary_and_analysis/2006_08_hirtle.html.
110. Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1115 (D. Nev. 2006).
111. See ASA, supra note 23, § 1.93 (defining non-consumptive use to include Image
Analysis and Text Extraction, Textual Analysis and Information Extraction, Linguistic
Analysis, Automated Translation, and Indexing and Search (research on different techniques
for indexing and search of textual content).
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reading the digitized copy of the book. If the data extracted does not allow
for the work to be reconstructed, there is no substitution of expressive value.
Extracting factual information about a work in terms of its linguistic
structure or the frequency of the occurrence of certain words, phrases, or
grammatical features is a non-expressive use.112
To start with a simple example, merely reporting the fact that the word
“whale” or “whales” appears 1,119 times in Herman Melville’s Moby Dick
does not infringe any copyright in the book because this information about
the work is entirely independent of the expressive value of the work.113 There
is no copyright in such basic information as the names of characters in a
novel or a list of places they have been.114 Nor is copyright infringed by the
simple observation that Melville writes a great deal about whales, old men,
the sea, boats, water, and ships. To preserve the force of the idea-expression
distinction in the age of reading machines, one must recognize that copyright
law does not prevent the automated extraction of such features by machine
applications, even if those machines reproduce the text as a step in the
analytical process. In this context, so long as the output is non-infringing, the
machine is non-infringing.
Consider, for example, Franco Moretti’s fascinating map of protagonists
in Parisian Novels and the objects of their desire.115 Aggregating information
across many books allows us to see not only that the heroes of this particular
genre are clustered in the Latin Quarter, but also that they are invariably
separated from their heart’s true desire by the River Seine and distributed in a
convex arc as if held from the Latin Quarter by a constant unseen force.
Moretti and a team of graduate students constructed this map by hand, but
there is no obvious reason why a similar process on a grander scale could not
be automated.

112. The ASA uses the awkward term “Non-Consumptive Research” to express the
same concept. The ASA defines Non-Consumptive Research as “research in which
computational analysis is performed on one or more Books, but not research in which a
researcher reads or displays substantial portions of a Book to understand the intellectual
content presented within the Book.” Id.
113. See supra Figure 2.
114. For a literary character to be protected as such by copyright it must, at a minimum,
be distinctively delineated such that it represents a specific incarnation and not a general
archetype. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th
Cir. 1954) sets a higher standard, that the “the character really constitutes the story being
told” and is not merely a “chess man in the game of telling the story.”
115. FRANCO MORETTI, GRAPHS, MAPS, TREES 55 (2005).
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Literature scholars have traditionally focused on a close reading of
canonical texts as the core of their discipline.116 Even those who venture
further afield do not travel that far. For example, literary historian Ian Watt’s
seminal 1957 work on the origins of the novel117 is undoubtedly a brilliant
synthesis of modern literature, and yet his entire scope of analysis is confined
to three authors.118 Three! Close reading of the literary cannon or of a few
dozen exemplar works in a particular literary genre is no doubt an impressive
skill, but the limits of this analysis are striking.119 Empirically, the cannon
itself cannot tell you anything about the characteristics that propel works into
the cannon in the first place. To make that judgment, you must compare the
cannon to the mass of other works all vying for that status but now largely
forgotten.
Data-mining and macro-analysis of literature offers broad possibilities.
Computer assisted text-analysis not only stores, searches, and retrieves text
efficiently, it also automates the process of measuring and classifying naturallanguage documents to identify patterns that may be associated with author,
subject, and genre or type.120 Macro-analysis does not replace reading
altogether, but it offers scholars a way to empirically test intuitions that are in
fact quantitative or comparative in nature.121 To take a rudimentary example,
the notion that female characters are underrepresented in a particular period
may be intuited from a small selection of prominent works. As such, macroanalysis of all the books from that period would allow that intuition to be
tested empirically and potentially confirmed or falsified.122 In his forthcoming
book, Macroanalysis: Methods for Digital Literary History, Matthew Jockers uses
various empirical techniques to identify the dominant themes in two of the
most famous American novels of the nineteenth century—The Last of the
Mohicans (1826) and Moby Dick (1851)—and contrast them against the
nineteenth century corpus as a whole. Jockers does not read all 10,000 novels
of the era,123 but instead undertakes this investigation using word frequency
116. See generally MATTHEW JOCKERS, MACROANALYSIS: DIGITAL METHODS AND
LITERARY HISTORY (forthcoming 2013).
117. IAN WATT, THE RISE OF THE NOVEL (1957).
118. Daniel Defoe, Samuel Richardson and Henry Fielding. See id. at 7.
119. There is an obvious parallel here with the rationale for conducting empirical legal
studies. See, e.g., Matthew Sag, Tonja Jacobi & Maxim Sytch, Ideology and Exceptionalism in
Intellectual Property: An Empirical Study, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 801 (2009).
120. See Geoffrey Rockwell, Why Bother With Computer-Assisted Text Analysis? A Short
Answer, TEXT ANALYSIS DEVELOPERS ALLIANCE (Apr. 30, 2005), http://tada.mcmaster.ca/
Main/WhatTA.
121. Id.
122. Id.; JOCKERS, supra note 116.
123. 10,000 is a very rough guess.
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analysis and computer generated topic modeling that identifies patterns based
on the frequency with which words are combined. Jockers is an English
professor, but he borrows techniques developed in computational linguistics
and natural language processing to take account of grammatical structure and
idiomatic usage in this analysis. No doubt, this is just the beginning of an
exciting new field. The question for lawyers, judges, and legal academics is
whether this type of analysis must be limited to public domain works and
those licensed by publishers.
C.

THE SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT WITH RESPECT TO THE NON-EXPRESSIVE
USE OF EXPRESSIVE WORKS

The prescription in this Article, that copyright law should not stand in
the way of the automated reproduction of text for non-expressive purposes,
rests on the view that, in general, the copyright owner’s exclusive rights are
limited to the right to communicate the expressive aspects of her work to the
public. To put it another way, copyright typically only concerns itself with the
threat of expressive substitution. As already noted, the idea-expression
distinction itself establishes that the copyright owner cannot prevent an
ordinary reader from extracting and reproducing the facts or ideas embodied
in her work. But the principle goes much deeper than this.
Copyright consists of a bundle of discrete exclusive rights, such as the
reproduction right, the derivative right, and the public performance and
display rights.124 These rights are defined, articulated, and limited by a
number of initially judge-made doctrines, such as the idea-expression
distinction, the threshold of substantial similarity, and the fair use doctrine.125
In my earlier work, I have explained in some detail that these doctrines
typically limit copyright protection to the expressive aspects of original works
of authorship in a way that confirms the place of public communication at
the heart of copyright.126 This Article will expand and clarify just a few of
these arguments.
1. Substantial Similarity
The tests courts apply to determine the threshold of infringement—i.e.,
when some copying is too much copying—strongly suggest that the statutory
rights of the author are limited to the communication of original expression

124. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(6) (2010).
125. The Copyright Act of 1976 also reflects the idea-expression distinction and the fair
use doctrine. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 107. But these doctrines remain essentially common
law features of the copyright system.
126. Sag, Copy-Reliant Technology, supra note 7.
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to the public. The copyright owner’s exclusive right to “reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies” extends to both exact and inexact
reproductions.127 In both cases, however, the Copyright Act leaves the
threshold of reproduction undefined. In cases of nonliteral infringement—
where the accused work is not an exact copy of the copyright owner’s
work—courts assess whether the allegedly infringing work possesses a
substantial similarity to the copyrighted work.128
Courts often define the threshold of substantial similarity from the
perspective of the ordinary observer.129 Infringement is defined in reference
to the perspective of the consuming public because the copyright owner’s
“legally protected interest is not, as such, his reputation . . . but his interest in
the potential financial returns from his [work] which derive from the lay
public’s approbation of his efforts.”130 Thus, the determination of whether
work “B” borrowed too much from work “A” hinges upon how the public
would regard the similarities between the works. But this is not the end of
the analysis. Even when two works are similar taken as a whole, any
similarities based on overlapping ideas or expressions that were not the
plaintiff’s to begin with “are by definition unprotected . . . .”131 A plaintiff in
a copyright case “must show that defendants’ works are substantially similar
to elements of plaintiff’s work that are copyrightable or protected by the
copyright.”132
In cases of fragmented literal similarity, courts determine whether the
copying amounts to infringement “by considering the qualitative and
quantitative significance of the copied portion in relation to the plaintiff’s
work as a whole.”133 This focus on the qualitative and quantitative
significance of the copied portion in the plaintiff’s work is consistent with
127. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir.
1930) (“[T]he question is whether the part so taken is substantial” (citing Marks v. Feist, 290
F. 959, 960 (2d Cir. 1923))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
128. See Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127,
131 (2d Cir. 2003); Laureyssens v. Idea Grp., Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1992).
129. This is especially true in the Second Circuit. See Shine v. Childs, 382 F. Supp. 2d
602, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (summarizing authorities). For a survey of other approaches, see
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03 (2012).
130. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (footnotes omitted); see also
Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983).
131. NIMMER supra note 129, § 13.03[2].
132. Whitehead v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 53 F. Supp. 2d 38, 46 (D.D.C. 1999)
(emphasis in original) (citing NIMMER, supra note 129, § 13.03[2].).
133. Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1195 (citing Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co.,
827 F.2d 569, 570 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also Jarvis v. A&M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282,
289–90 (D.N.J. 1993); NIMMER, supra note 129, § 13.03[A][2][a].
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the prohibition against expressive substitution. Even where some of the
copyright owner’s original expression has been copied directly, such copying
does not rise to the level of infringement unless the expression was
significant, in either quantity or quality, in the author’s original work.134 Just
as copyright law does not prevent the copying of facts and ideas, it also does
not prevent the copying of trivial expressive elements from an existing work,
because to do so does not unfairly compete with the copyright owner.135 In
other words, trivial copying of expressive elements is not copyright
infringement because it does not interfere with the copyright owner’s
exclusive right to communicate her work to the public.
In summary, the very mechanics of assessing whether the threshold of
substantial similarity has been met provide further evidence that copyright
primarily protects the author against expressive substitution.
2. Intermediate Copying
For those in Hollywood, facing dubious claims of copyright infringement
is a recognized cost of doing business.136 Presumably, some of these claims
are opportunistic, while others are the product of self-delusion. The
attraction of a substantial payday combined with passing similarities based on
title, theme, or subject matter can be enough to trigger a suit. What is
significant for the purposes of this Article is that when confronted with
motions for summary judgment based on an objective lack of similarity
between their own work and that of the defendant, plaintiffs in a number of
cases have turned to allegations of intermediate copying.137 Typically,
plaintiffs in this situation will urge the courts to allow scrutiny of every single
134. Newton, 388 F.3d at 1195 (9th Cir. 2004). The court noted:
Fragmented literal similarity exists where the defendant copies a portion
of the plaintiff’s work exactly or nearly exactly, without appropriating the
work’s overall essence or structure. Because the degree of similarity is high
in such cases, the dispositive question is whether the copying goes to
trivial or substantial elements. Substantiality is measured by considering
the qualitative and quantitative significance of the copied portion in
relation to the plaintiff’s work as a whole.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
135. Id. at 1193, 1195 (“The principle that trivial copying does not constitute actionable
infringement has long been a part of copyright law. . . . [T]he dispositive question is whether
the copying goes to trivial or substantial elements.”).
136. Meritorious cases tend to be settled in private through Writers Guild arbitration.
137. See, e.g., Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 299 (6th Cir. 2004);
Flaherty, v. Filardi, No. 03 Civ. 2167, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69202, at *8–9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
19, 2007) (dismissing copyright claim to interim drafts of a published non-infringing final
work as a matter of law); Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 430, 434–35
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (denying request to discover drafts).
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draft of the defendant’s screenplay, in the hope that some earlier version of
the work will disclose a greater resemblance to their own copyrighted work
than the finished film does. Courts invariably deny these requests.138 The
reasons behind the denials provide an important insight into the structure of
copyright law.
Courts refuse to entertain discovery with respect to early drafts of a noninfringing final work precisely because infringement requires at least some
potential interference with the copyright owner’s expectation of exclusivity.
As noted in Davis v. United Artists, “the ultimate test of infringement must be
the film as produced and broadcast, we do not consider the preliminary
scripts.”139 Courts do not refuse to examine interim drafts merely because of
judicial economy. As the Second Circuit noted in Warner Bros., Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Cos., “a defendant may legitimately avoid infringement by
intentionally making sufficient changes in a work which would otherwise be
regarded as substantially similar to that of the plaintiff’s.”140 Likewise, in See v.
Durang, the Ninth Circuit held “[t]he only discovery plaintiff suggests is the
production of early drafts of defendant’s play on the theory they might
reflect copying from plaintiff’s play that was disguised or deleted in later
drafts. Copying deleted or so disguised as to be unrecognizable is not
copying.”141
The refusal of courts to entertain copyright infringement allegations in
relation to unpublished drafts and preliminary scripts demonstrates the
practical importance of a focus on expressive substitution. Because the
copyright owner’s rights are generally limited to the communication of their
original expression to the public, even if it were not in the public domain, a
filmmaker would be perfectly entitled to start with Jane Austen’s Emma and
138. See id. at 435 (noting that courts routinely reject requests to consider earlier drafts
of screenplays).
139. Davis v. United Artists, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 722, 724 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (citing
Fuld v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 390 F. Supp. 877, 882 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)); see also Stromback, 384
F.3d at 299 (“In deciding infringement claims, courts have held that only the version of the
alleged infringing work presented to the public should be considered.”); Madrid v. Chronicle
Books, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1234 (D. Wyo. 2002) (“Since a court considers the works as
they were presented to the public, discovery in this case . . . would be pointless.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Walker, 615 F. Supp. at 434 (“The Court considers the works as
they were presented to the public.”).
140. Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing 3
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[B] at 13-38.1 to 38.2; Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field &
Co., 675 F.2d 498, 501 (2d Cir. 1982); Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 904, 913 &
n.11 (2d Cir. 1980)). Courts addressing the question of intermediate copying in the software
context have seen the matter slightly differently. See infra, note 172 and accompanying text.
141. See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1983).

1503-1550_SAG_031013_WEB_WORD2003 (DO NOT DELETE)

1532

3/10/2013 10:53:32 PM

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27:1503

rework the plot over and over again until she comes out with Clueless.142
Intermediate scripts that never see the light of day do not communicate the
author’s original expression to the public and thus cannot constitute
copyright infringement.
3. The Implications of Computer Software and Other Functional Works
Protected by Copyright Law
Copyright protection for computer software has long been a source of
controversy and disquiet.143 Although the statutory definition of “literary
works” in the Copyright Act is broad enough to include computer
programs,144 treating software as a work of literature presents something of a
contradiction. The 1976 Copyright Act clearly states that copyright
protection does not extend to any “process, system, [or] method of
operation . . . .”145 And yet, as made clear by a 1980 amendment to the Act,
Congress intended that copyright protection would extend to computer
programs.146 The amendment defines a computer program as “a set of
statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in
order to bring about a certain result.”147 A “set of instructions” used “in
order to bring about a certain result” appears to be the very essence of the
“process, system, method of operation” exclusion under § 102(b).
With this contradiction in mind, it is hardly surprising that the general
theory of copyright advanced in this Article—the centrality of expressive
substitution—does not fit perfectly to software.148 Users do not typically
142. CLUELESS (Paramount 1995). See Suzanne Ferriss, Emma Becomes Clueless, in JANE
AUSTEN IN HOLLYWOOD 122 (Linda Troost & Sayre Greenfield eds. 2000).
143. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Four Reasons and a Paradox: The Manifest Superiority of Copyright
over Sui Generis Protection of Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2559 (1994); Peter S. Menell,
An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045
(1989); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs,
94 COLUM. L. REV 2308 (1994).
144. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010) (“literary works” includes works “expressed in words,
numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia”).
145. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Exclusive rights in processes and methods of operation are
generally left to the patent system. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
146. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247–49 (3d
Cir. 1983) (reviewing legislative history); but see Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The
Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J.
663.
147. Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 101, 94 Stat.
3028 (1980).
148. The same objections could be raised with respect to the copyright protection of
architectural plans and the following discussion applies mutatis mutandis to that subject
matter. The Berne Convention Implementation Act (1988) and the Architectural Works
Copyright Protection Act (1990) recognize two separate forms of protection for architectural
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copy copyrighted computer programs so that they can imbibe the artistry of
the programmer’s expression. Even if computer programs are to some extent
expressive, they are predominantly functional.149 The distinction between
expressive and non-expressive uses is not intended to eviscerate copyright
protection for computer software. As the preceding discussion makes clear,
the rational justification for copyright is generally that it protects the author
against expressive substitution. But the anomalous nature of computer
software points to a different basis for attaching copyright protection and
thus does not admit a defense of non-expressive use to the same extent. In
sum, computer software (and other functional works that have been grafted
onto copyright) should continue to be treated as exceptional—nonexpressive use should not be regarded as a defense to ordinary acts of
software piracy.150
Combined with the idea-expression distinction, this brief review of the
application of the tests for substantial similarity and fragmented non-literal
similarity, and the refusal of courts to apply the author’s reproduction right
to intermediate drafts that never see the light of day, all point in the same
direction: the copyright owner’s exclusive rights are limited to the right to
communicate the expressive aspects of her work to the public. This point is
important because once it is understood that copyright’s primary function is
to protect the author from the threat of expressive substitution, the case in
favor of non-expressive uses becomes almost self-evident. Standing alone, a
non-expressive use carries no threat of expressive substitution and such uses
should thus fall outside the scope of an author’s entitlement.
D.

ACTIVATING THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-EXPRESSIVE USE THROUGH
FAIR USE
1. Why Fair Use

The preceding discussion concentrates on why we should recognize a
general principle that non-expressive use is non-infringing; this Section turns
works, one for architectural plans and the other for structures based on such plans. For an
overview, see 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08 (2012).
149. Pamela Samuelson, supra note 143, at 2315–18 (explaining that “the primary source
of value in a program is its behavior, not its text”); Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection Of
Computer Program Structure, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 519, 532 (1998) (arguing that computer
programs “are not like dictionaries or maps, which are useful only insofar as they supply
information to human beings. A computer program is not intended to be ‘read’ or
‘understood’ by its target audience, let alone appeal to a user’s sense of esthetics.”).
150. However, as noted below, the non-expressive use analysis still provides a useful
framework for understanding software reverse engineering cases. See infra notes 173–176 and
accompanying text.
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to the prescriptive implications of that principle, i.e., the question of how it
should be recognized. The answer, in short, is that the reproduction of
expressive copyrighted works for non-expressive uses requires contextspecific review under the fair use doctrine for three reasons.
The first reason is simply that to hold otherwise would contradict the
Copyright Act’s plain language. Section 106(1) of the Act gives copyright
owners the exclusive rights “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies.”151
Copies are defined as “material objects . . . in which a work is fixed . . . and
from which the work can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise
communicated.”152 Thus, to make a prima facie infringing reproduction, one
need only reproduce the work in a stable format such that it is capable of
being perceived and used expressively. There is no express requirement in
the Act that anyone actually perceives the work or uses it expressively.
The second reason, as already noted, is that blanket exclusion for nonexpressive use would substantially undermine the legal protection of
copyright’s more irregular subject matter, such as computer software and
architectural plans. Applying the principle of non-expressive use to
anomalous copyright subject matter must be considered carefully. Rightly or
wrongly, Congress has extended copyright protection to computer software
and architectural plans to provide incentives for the development of these
primarily functional objects.153 Although computer programs are treated as
expressive literary works, their expressive elements are secondary to the
functional output of the program—i.e., what it actually does. In consequence,
the everyday use of a computer program is non-expressive, but that does not
suggest that copyright protection for software should be effectively
dismantled. Instead, courts must exercise caution when dealing with
anomalous copyright subject matter so as not to negate the very protection
Congress intended.
The third reason not to adopt a per se rule with respect to nonexpressive use is that in many contexts the concept is ambiguous. Like its
subject matter equivalent, the idea-expression distinction, the line between
expressive use and non-expressive use may often turn out to be a matter of
context and degree. Where the validity of a defendant’s claim that a particular
151. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2010).
152. Id. § 101 (emphasis added).
153. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247 (3d
Cir. 1983) (noting that “[a]lthough section 102(a) does not expressly list computer programs
as works of authorship, the legislative history suggests that programs were considered
copyrightable as literary works.”); Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No
101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5133 (1990).
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use is non-expressive is contestable, courts may find that adopting a
categorical rule that non-expressive uses are non-infringing simply shifts the
argument’s focus from substantive issues to questions of category definition.
For these three reasons, it is submitted that the principle of nonexpressive use should be applied in the context of copyright’s fair use
doctrine and not as a freestanding defense to copyright infringement.
2. Application to Fair Use
This Section explores how the principle of non-expressive use should be
(and, implicitly, is being) applied to the traditional four-factor fair use inquiry
required under § 107 of the Copyright Act.154
a) The “Purpose and Character” of Non-Expressive Uses
The non-expressive nature of the defendant’s use is perhaps most
relevant under the first fair use factor, “the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes.”155 Recognizing the copyright owner’s exclusive rights
as implicitly defined and limited in reference to expressive communication to
the public makes sense of both expressive and non-expressive fair uses.
Indeed, recognition of this overarching principle may be the key to rescuing
the concept of transformative use from elastic imprecision.
According to the Supreme Court’s most recent fair use decision, Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose, the first factor turns primarily on:
[W]hether the new use merely supersedes the objects of the original
creation . . . or instead adds something new, with a further purpose
or different character, altering the first with new expression,
meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what
extent the new work is “transformative.” . . . Although such
transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair

154. 17 U.S.C. § 107. The factors are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
Id.

155. Id.
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use . . . the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is
generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.156

Traditionally, courts apply the concept of transformative use to new
expressive uses that “provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier
work, and, in the process, creat[e] a new one.”157 Transformative use is most
obvious when the work is itself transformed; however, in many cases courts
have held that the mere recontextualization of a copyrighted work from one
expressive context to another is sufficient to sustain a finding of fair use—
the work itself need not be altered.158
Understanding the rationale for transformative use is the key to grasping
the link between transformative use and non-expressive use. The privileged
status of transformative uses under the fair use doctrine allows for the
creation of new works from old. This is not a sufficient explanation,
however, because other doctrinal levers, such as a narrower understanding of
the author’s exclusive right to make derivative works, could achieve the same
effect.159 Beyond a simple enthusiasm for new works based on the
copyrighted work, courts accord special status to transformative uses because
they do not substitute for the author’s original expression—they do not
merely supersede the objects of the original creation.160 Because of this
special status, the greater the extent of transformation, the less significant
other factors weighing against fair use will become.161
Cognizant of the Supreme Court’s focus on transformative uses, some
courts have simply equated non-expressive with transformative. In Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Amazon, Inc., the court held that Google’s use of thumbnails in its
Internet search engine “may be more transformative than a parody because a
search engine provides an entirely new use for the original work, while a

156. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted); see also Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use
Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990) (“I believe the answer to the question of
justification turns primarily on whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is
transformative.”).
157. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
158. See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609–10 (2d
Cir. 2006) (holding that use of promotional posters in a rock biography was “a purpose
separate and distinct from the original artistic and promotional purpose for which the images
were created”); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796–98, 800–06 (9th
Cir. 2003) (concluding that photos parodying Barbie by depicting “nude Barbie dolls
juxtaposed with vintage kitchen appliances” was a fair use).
159. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
160. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
161. Id.
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parody typically has the same entertainment purpose as the original work.”162
This scenario seems to be stretching the concept of transformation beyond
its natural utility. It would be better to recognize uses that do not relate to
the expressive appeal of a work may find favor under the first fair use
factor—whether they qualify as transformative in the expressive sense or not.
By construction, the more non-expressive the use of a copyrighted work
is, the less it substitutes for the author’s original expression.163 As such,
courts should regard primarily non-expressive uses as equivalent (but not
identical) to highly transformative uses—their “purpose and character” is
such that they do not merely supersede the objects of the original creation.164
In addition, the same logic that dictates that the more transformative a work
is, the less significant the other factors become, also applies to nonexpressive uses.165
b) Non-Expressive Use and Commercial Fair Use
While considering the “purpose and character of the use” under the first
factor, courts are instructed to consider “whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.”166 The status of commercial
fair use has proved to be confusing in the fair use case law, in part because it
is so closely linked with the question of market substitution under the fourth
factor.167 Even if commercial entities develop and maintain copy-reliant
technologies such as search engines, this does not weaken their claim to fair
use.168 If a use is non-expressive, its commercial or noncommercial nature is

162. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding
further that “even making an exact copy of a work may be transformative so long as the
copy serves a different function than the original work” (citing Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,
336 F.3d 811, 818–19 (9th Cir. 2003)).
163. The analysis in this Section is subject to the caveat regarding computer software
and other quasi-functional works discussed in Section III.C.3, supra.
164. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583.
165. See id. at 579.
166. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2010).
167. Sag, Predicting Fair Use, supra note 22, at 58–61. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit’s approach
to commerciality in Napster defines the concept exclusively in terms of market substitution.
See A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that “commercial
use is demonstrated by a showing that repeated and exploitative unauthorized copies of
copyrighted works were made to save the expense of purchasing authorized copies”).
168. This assessment is reinforced by recent empirical analysis of fair use cases in U.S.
district courts, Sag, Predicting Fair Use, supra note 22, at 77 (finding that there is no evidence
that commercial use plays any objectively ascertainable role in determining the outcome of
fair use cases). Non-commercial entities such as universities may have an especially strong
claim to fair use for reasons related to their non-commercial status, but not because of the status
itself. For example, copying by a university for the purposes of research or education may be
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irrelevant because non-expressive uses do not substitute for the author’s
original expression.169
c) Non-Expressive Use and “Amount and Substantiality”
The degree that a use is non-expressive is also significant in terms of the
third fair use factor, “the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”170 Far from being linear or
arithmetic in nature, proper application of the third factor is contingent upon
the purpose and the effect of the defendant’s use.171 Instead of relying on a
mechanical quantification of the amount of the original work used, the third
factor asks courts to assess how much of the value of the original work is
present in the allegedly infringing work.172 Accordingly, the extent to which a
use is non-expressive plays a vital role in the assessment of the third fair use
factor. A non-expressive use does not generally substitute for the expressive
value of the author’s original expression, and therefore courts should view it
as qualitatively insignificant under the third factor, even if it involves literal
copying of an entire work.
This insight helps us make sense of the superficial conflict between
Hollywood cases alleging intermediate copying and analogous Silicon Valley
cases.173 In cases involving motion pictures, courts have refused to apply the
author’s reproduction right to allegedly infringing intermediate drafts of
screenplays. However, courts addressing the question of intermediate
copying in the software context have seen the matter slightly differently.174 In
software reverse engineering cases, courts appear to take the allegation of
infringement via intermediate copying seriously as a potential basis for
infringement.175 This difference is best explained by the anomalous nature of

less likely to have a market effect or may generate positive externalities, which make efficient
licensing less likely.
169. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (noting the caveat relating to anomalous
copyright subject matter such as computer software).
170. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3). This inquiry can be traced back to Justice Story’s original
formulation of the fair use doctrine in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (No.
4,901). In that case, Justice Story was concerned to protect the “chief value of the original
work” against the extraction of its “essential parts” through the mere “facile use of scissors”
or its intellectual equivalent. Id. at 345.
171. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586–87 (1994) (“the extent of
permissible copying varies with the purpose and character of the use”).
172. See Matthew Sag, God in the Machine, A New Structural Analysis of Copyright’s Fair Use
Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 381, 391 (2005).
173. The terms Hollywood and Silicon Valley are used representationally.
174. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518–19 (9th Cir. 1992).
175. Id. at 1519. The Sega court found that:
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computer software itself. Although software is protected under the
expressive regime of copyright law, the value of software that the law is
protecting relates to the function or behavior of the code, not to its
expression. In contrast, a screenplay has no behavioral value beyond the
communication of the author’s expression to the public. Thus it makes sense
that in film cases allegations of intermediate copying would be categorically
dismissed, whereas in software cases the courts would take a more contextual
approach and review the allegation as a question of fair use.176
Returning to the third factor itself, the reverse engineering cases nicely
illustrate the contention that non-expressive uses do not generally substitute
for the value of the work. In Sony v. Connectix, for example, the court
acknowledged that Connectix had copied an entire section of Sony’s software
multiple times; however, it concluded “in a case of intermediate infringement
when the final product does not itself contain infringing material, this factor
is of very little weight.”177
d) The Market Effect of Non-Expressive Uses
The fourth fair use factor is “the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.”178 Of course, the question of
market effect risks collapsing into tautology because every use by a defendant
represents something that could, in theory, be licensed to the defendant if the
court rules that such use is not fair use. But courts avoid this circular
reasoning by limiting the abstract market to a market that is cognizable under
copyright. The market harms that courts refuse to recognize illustrate again
that the copyright owner’s exclusive rights are limited to the communication
of their original expression to the public. The case law indicates that courts
exclude consideration of market effects that do not arise from expressive
substitution.

[I]ntermediate copying . . . may infringe the exclusive rights granted to the
copyright owner in section 106 of the Copyright Act regardless of
whether the end product of the copying also infringes those rights. If
intermediate copying is permissible under the Act, authority for such
copying must be found in one of the statutory provisions to which the
rights granted in section 106 are subject.
Id.

176. However, the reverse engineering cases all find that the practice is fair use,
suggesting that future courts might invoke a per se analysis for the sake of judicial economy.
See infra note 179.
177. Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 606 (9th Cir. 2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
178. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2010).
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In Campbell, the Supreme Court quite plainly differentiated the copyright
owner’s general economic interests from the limited protection afforded by
copyright:
[W]hen a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills demand
for the original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the
Copyright Act. Because parody may quite legitimately aim at
garroting the original, destroying it commercially as well as
artistically, the role of the courts is to distinguish between biting
criticism that merely suppresses demand and copyright
infringement, which usurps it. 179

Just as Campbell recognizes that criticism is outside of the copyright
owner’s protectable sphere of interest, the reverse engineering cases
recognize that the copyright owner has no protectable interest in preventing
the copying of unprotectable expression and ideas buried within its object
code. Courts have consistently held that making unauthorized copies of a
computer program, as a necessary step in reverse engineering, is fair use.180
For example, in Sony v. Connectix, the Ninth Circuit held that although the
defendant’s Virtual Game Station console directly competed with Sony in the
market for platforms capable of playing Sony Playstation games, the Virtual
Game Station was a “legitimate competitor” in that market.181 The court
concluded that Sony’s desire to control the market for gaming platforms was
understandable but that “copyright law . . . does not confer such a monopoly.”182
The treatment of parody and reverse engineering illustrates the exclusion
of market effects that do not arise from expressive substitution. This
rationale is implicit in Campbell where the Court notes “[p]eople ask for
179. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591–92 (1994) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
180. See, e.g., Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 606, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 871 (2000)
(holding that Connectix’s copying of Sony’s copyrighted basic input-output system (BIOS)
during reverse engineering, used by Connectix to develop a software program that emulates
the functioning of the Sony PlayStation console for regular computers, was fair use); Atari
Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 842–43 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (observing
that Atari’s reverse engineering of Nintendo’s 10NES program would have been a fair use of
the program, except that Atari did not possess an authorized copy of the work); Sega Enters.
Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that Accolade’s reverse
engineering of Sega’s video game programs in order to figure out how to make its own
games compatible with Sega’s Genesis system is a fair use); see also David A. Rice, Copyright
and Contract: Preemption After Bowers v. Baystate, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 595, 601 n.19
(2004) (collecting cases). Circumventing encryption for the purpose of reverse engineering is
also allowed under the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f).
181. Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 607; see also Sega, 977 F.2d at 1522–23.
182. Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 607 (emphasis added); see also Sega, 977 F.2d at
1523–24.
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criticism, but they only want praise.”183 Thus, “the unlikelihood that creators
of imaginative works will license critical reviews or lampoons of their own
productions removes such uses from the very notion of a potential licensing
market.”184 This rationale is explicit in the reverse engineering cases. From
the beginning of its decision in Sony v. Connectix, the court emphasized the
importance of the idea-expression distinction: “[w]e are called upon once
again to apply the principles of copyright law to computers and their
software, to determine what must be protected as expression and what must
be made accessible to the public as function.”185 Consistent with its decision
in Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc.,186 the Ninth Circuit held in Sony v. Connectix
that intermediate copying of software is fair use if the copying was necessary
to gain access to the software’s functional elements.187 The court based its
ruling firmly on the importance of maintaining the idea-expression
distinction: “[w]e drew this distinction because the Copyright Act protects
expression only, not ideas or the functional aspects of a software
program . . . . Thus, the fair use doctrine preserves public access to the ideas
and functional elements embedded in copyrighted computer software
programs.”188
In the case of expressive uses such as parody, and non-expressive uses
such as reverse engineering, courts have consistently held that the protection
that copyright affords is limited to certain cognizable markets.
Transformative expressive uses do not usually affect the market in any
relevant sense because the second author’s expression does not substitute for
that of the original author. The absence of any cognizable market effect is
even more apparent in cases of non-expressive use because, to the degree
that a particular use is non-expressive, it has no potential substitution effect
on a cognizable copyright market.
As established earlier in this Part, the copyright owner’s exclusive rights
typically hinge upon the communication of original expression to the public.
Acts of copying that do not communicate the author’s original expression to
the public should not generally be held to constitute copyright infringement.
The most appropriate method of doctrinal incorporation of the principle of
non-expressive use is through the fair use doctrine. The role of expressive

183. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 (quoting SUMMERSET MAUGHAM, OF HUMAN BONDAGE
241 (Penguin ed. 1992)).
184. Id.
185. Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 598.
186. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1510.
187. Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 607.
188. Id. at 603 (citing Sega, 997 F.2d at 1510).
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substitution is not merely compatible with the fair use doctrine; more
accurately, expressive substitution is necessary to make sense of much
existing case law. It is unrealistic to attempt to reduce the entirety of fair use
jurisprudence into any one coherent principle. Nonetheless, the general
proposition that the doctrine favors acts of copying unlikely to substitute for
the copyright owner’s original expression explains the majority of cases. Like
transformative expressive uses, primarily non-expressive uses should
generally be classified as fair uses because, by their very nature, they do not
substitute for the author’s original expression. Accordingly, like
transformative use, non-expressive use should be favored under the first,
third, and fourth factors—such uses are non-substitutive in “purpose and
character,” appropriate a qualitatively insignificant proportion of the value of
the copyright owner’s original expression, and produce no cognizable market
effect under the fourth factor.189
IV.

CONCLUSION: UNLEASH THE MACHINES

Digital technology offers powerful tools for organizing, analyzing, and
searching through an otherwise overwhelming sea of information. The
legality of these tools has generally been accepted in the purely online context
of text-based and visual search engines and the context of software enabled
plagiarism detection systems.190 The library digitization debate brings the
same issue to a new context: printed books.
The Authors Guild’s campaign against the Google book search initiative
came to an abrupt halt with the proposal of a class action settlement in 2008,
followed by an Amended Settlement Agreement in 2009. That agreement has
since been rejected by the supervising court and the legality of Google’s
initiative is still disputed by many authors and publishers. Google has
provided electronic versions of millions of library books to the university
libraries that made the paper copies initially available. Those universities must
now determine how, if at all, they should use this resource. In 2008, several

189. As is so often the case, the second statutory factor does not appear to have much
bite in the context of non-expressive uses, and thus does little to “separat[e] the fair use
sheep from the infringing goats.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586
(1994). See Sag, Predicting Fair Use, supra note 22.
190. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009); Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Amazon, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811
(9th Cir. 2003); Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1117–19 (D. Nev. 2006).
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universities agreed to combine their digital collections in a shared repository
called the HathiTrust.191
In September 2011, the Authors Guild announced that it was suing five
universities and the HathiTrust for the “systematic, concerted, widespread and
unauthorized reproduction and distribution of millions of copyrighted
books . . . .”192 The Guild objects to the universities’ plan to distribute works
for which they have been unable to locate the copyright owner, i.e., orphan
works.193 Implausibly, the Guild stakes the claim that libraries are not entitled
to fair use under § 107 of the Copyright Act because libraries are the
beneficiary of a more limited exemption under § 108.194 Whether the limited
reproduction and distribution of orphan works is permitted by fair use is a
crucial question, but it is not the subject of this Article. Instead, this Article
addresses the other aspect of the Guild’s claim, the assertion that even library
digitization restricted to enabling data analysis constitutes “one of the largest
copyright infringements in history . . . .”195
The HathiTrust aims to develop and facilitate the development of data
mining and analysis of its digital collection.196 This activity would have
qualified as “non-consumptive research” under the now defunct Amended
Settlement Agreement (“ASA”).197 “Non-consumptive research” as defined
in the ASA is a form of non-expressive use as the term is used in this Article.
According to the Authors Guild, in the absence of a class action settlement
191. The HathiTrust includes material provided by Google, the Internet Archive,
Microsoft, and the universities themselves. See Our Digital Library, HATHITRUST DIGITAL
LIBRARY, http://www.hathitrust.org/digital_library (July 17, 2012).
192. Authors Guild, Australian Society of Authors, Quebec Writers Union Sue Five U.S.
Universities, AUTHORS GUILD BLOG (Sept. 12, 2011), http://blog.authorsguild.org/
2011/09/12/authors-guild-australian-society-of-authors-quebec-writers-union-sue-five-u-suniversities-2/. In October 2012, the district court released its opinion in Authors Guild, Inc.
v. HathiTrust, 11 CV 6351 HB, 2012 WL 4808939 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2012).
193. First Amended Complaint, Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, No. 11 Civ. 6351,
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2011).
194. Id.
195. Id. ¶ 7. Paragraph 68 of the Amended Complaint also states:
[U]sers may search and identify bibliographic information (title, author,
subject, ISBN, publisher, and year of publication) for the works contained
in the HDL. HathiTrust also permits all users to search the entire text of
all works in the HDL (including public domain and in-copyright works) to
determine the number of times and page location(s) of any keyword or
phrase found in a book.
Id. ¶ 68.
196. Functional Objectives, H ATHI T RUST D IGITAL L IBRARY (Nov. 5, 2010),
http://www.hathitrust.org/objectives.
197. ASA, supra note 23, § 1.93.
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or some express authorization by copyright owners, the creation of systems
for the automated analysis of library books constitutes copyright
infringement.198 If this is correct, then the non-expressive use of copyrighted
works will be impeded: the large number of permissions required and the
difficulty of locating and identifying the relevant interests makes rightclearance on the scale of millions of works implausible.199
Where large-scale electronic text collections are available, advances in
computational power and a proliferation of new text mining and visualization
tools offer scholars of the humanities the chance to do what biologists,
physicists, and economists have been doing for decades—analyze data.200
Scholars in the “Digital Humanities” believe that text mining and the
computational analysis of text are vital to the progress of human knowledge
in the “Information Age.” The potential of these non-expressive uses of text
has already been made apparent in the life sciences where researchers use a
variety of text-mining tools to accelerate the identification of relevant
research across disparate fields and to suggest hitherto unseen correlations or
associations such as protein-protein interactions and gene-disease
associations.201
Similar breakthroughs are on the horizon in the humanities. Traditionally,
literary scholars have relied upon the close and often anecdotal study of
select works. Modern computing power and the mass-digitization of texts
now permits investigation of the larger literary record.
Literary analyses of digitized collections are at the core of Digital
Humanities research. Large scale quantitative projects such as those being
undertaken at the Stanford Literary Lab are unearthing previously
unknowable information about individual works, genres, and even entire
eras.202 Digitization enhances our ability to process, mine, and ultimately
198. First Amended Complaint, supra note 193.
199. Imagine someone other than a phone company trying to write a new telephone
book and having to ask every household for permission.
200. This paragraph and remainder of the text were written in parallel with two amicus
briefs, one in Authors Guild v. HathiTrust and one in Authors Guild v. Google. Matthew Jockers,
Jason Schultz, and I jointly authored these briefs. We were assisted by many people, most
notably, David Hansen and Ana Enriquez.
201. Sophia Ananiadou, Douglas B. Kell & Jun-ichi Tsujii, Text mining and its potential
applications in systems biology, 24:12 TRENDS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 571 (2006) (citing Christian
Blaschke et al., Information extraction in molecular biology, 3 BRIEF. BIOINFORM. 154 (2002);
Toshihide Ono et al., Automated extraction of information on protein-protein interactions from the
biological literature, 12 BIOINFORMATICS 155 (2001)).
202. The Stanford Literary Lab discusses, designs, and pursues literary research of a
digital and quantitative nature. About, STANFORD LITERARY LAB, http://litlab.stanford.edu/
(last visited June 18, 2012).
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better understand individual texts, the connections between texts, and the
overall evolution of literary language. As Matthew Jockers explains, by
exploring the literary record writ large, researchers can better understand the
context in which individual texts exist and thereby better understand those
individual texts.203 As Franco Moretti has further noted, “a field this large
cannot be understood by stitching together separate bits of knowledge about
individual cases, because it isn’t a sum of individual cases: it’s a collective
system, that should be grasped as a whole . . . .”204 Grasping a system as a
whole is not possible without the ability to make non-expressive uses of
digitized text. For some, the possibility of mining huge digital archives has
been a major catalyst for changing the very conception of humanities
research. For others, it is a useful tool for testing old theories or suggesting
new areas of inquiry.
Researchers in Information Retrieval frequently use text-mining and
computer-aided classification to identify and retrieve relevant documents.
Using similar techniques, researchers in the Digital Humanities use text
mining and computer-aided classification to identify and retrieve relevant
texts, often found in unlikely places. This enables researchers in the
humanities to expand their traditional study of a few, canonical works to a
study of any one of the several million books in the larger archive of literary
history, an archive that has hitherto remained hidden because of the
limitations of human reading. Thus, non-expressive use leads to additional
expressive use and thus expands the audience (and the potential market) for
individual works.205
Moreover, digitization also allows scholars to reimagine the relationships
between texts. For example, the Google Ancient Places project links the text
of public domain books such as Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire
to a map of the ancient world.206 The interface allows the user to browse the
books, including the full text, at the same time as she browses a map. The
places are marked on the map and hyperlinked. Again, the map itself is a
non-expressive use of the underlying texts, but such use may well still lead to

203. JOCKERS, supra note 116.
204. MORETTI, supra note 115, at 4.
205. For example, Matthew Jockers used text-mining and computer-aided classification
to identify an overlooked tradition of whaling fiction predating (and arguably informing)
Melville’s writing of Moby Dick. See JOCKERS, supra note 116.
206. About, GOOGLE ANCIENT PLACES, http://googleancientplaces.wordpress.com/about/
(last visited July 17, 2012).
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additional expressive use and expansion of the audience—and, again the
potential market—for individual works.207
The Google Ngram tool provides a simple example of such nonexpressive use. The comparison of the frequency with which authors refer to
the United States as a single entity (“is”) versus a collection of individual
states (“are”) is only possible with a digitized archive of significant size and
coverage.208
Figure 5: Google Ngram Visualization Comparing Frequency of
“The United States is” to “The United States are”

207. In a similar vein, researchers at Stanford University have mapped thousands of
letters exchanged during the Enlightenment and have pieced together how these individual
networks fit into a complete whole they refer to as the “Republic of Letters.” See Mapping the
Republic of Letters, https://republicofletters.stanford.edu/ (last visited June 20, 2012). One
such visualization yields the surprising insight that although Voltaire admired England for its
tolerance, freedom and political institutions, surprisingly few letters actually went to
England. See Patricia Cohen, Digital Keys for Unlocking the Humanities’ Riches, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
17, 2010, at C1.
208. Google Books Ngram Viewer, GOOGLE.COM, http://books.google.com/ngrams (last
visited June 30, 2012). Figure 5 is a reconstruction of data generated using Google Ngram,
sampled at 5-year intervals. The y-axis is scaled to 1/100,000 of a percent, such that
1=0.00001%. This particular ngram can be reproduced as follows: http://books.google.
com/ngrams/graph?content=The+United+States+is%2C+The+United+States+are&year_
start=1780&year_end=1900&corpus=5&smoothing=10.
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Note that metadata produced in this visualization was only possible
because the entire contents of the relevant books had been digitized. But
note also that not a single sentence of the underlying books has been
reproduced in the finished product. This kind of non-expressive use may add
to our understanding, appreciation, and enjoyment of copyrighted works, but
since it does not allow for the underlying works to be reconstructed, it could
hardly be said to substitute for the originals.209
Google Ngram is just the tip of an emerging iceberg.210 In a forthcoming
book Macroanalysis: Digital Methods and Literary History,211 Professor Jockers
draws on a corpus of nineteenth century novels to demonstrate how literary
style changes over time. By studying word frequencies, syntactic patterns, and
thematic markers in the context of metadata about author nationality, author
gender, and historical time period, this kind of work opens up literary study
to an entirely new perspective. Thus, in the larger context of the digital
archive, Jockers is able to identify both the trendsetters and the outliers. Text
mining and computational analysis can lead to surprising results. For
example, Jockers demonstrates that Harriet Beecher Stowe’s fiction is far
more similar to the work of male authors of her generation than to the
typically female-authored works of sentimental fiction among which her
work is generally categorized.
The macro analysis of text archives has the potential to yield specific
insights into literary historical questions, such as the historic place of
individual texts, authors, and genres in relation to a larger literary context;
literary patterns and lexicons employed over time, across periods, within
regions, or within demographic groups; the cultural and societal forces that
impact literary style and the evolution of style; the waxing and waning of
209. For additional examples of the use of Ngram, see, for example, Jean-Baptiste
Michel, et al., Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books, 331 SCIENCE 176
(2011) (a study of study linguistic and cultural changes in over five million digitized books)
available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/331/6014/176.
210. The toolkit available to Digital Humanities researchers is becoming increasingly
sophisticated. See, e.g., TAPOR http://www.tapor.ca/ (last visited June 30, 2012) (tools to
map word usage over time, including peaks, density, collocations, and types); Andrew
Kachites McCallum, MALLET: A MAchine Learning for LanguagE Toolkit,
http://mallet.cs.umass.edu/ (last visited June 30, 2012) (a Java-based package for statistical
natural language processing, document classification, clustering, topic modeling, information
extraction, and other machine learning applications to text); MONK: Metadata Offer New
Knowledge, http://www.monkproject.org/(last visited June 30, 2012) (a digital environment
designed to help humanities scholars discover and analyze patterns in the texts); SEASR:
THE SOFTWARE ENVIRONMENT FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCHOLARLY RESEARCH,
http://www.seasr.org (last visited June 30, 2012).
211. UIUC Press (forthcoming 2013).
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literary themes; and the tastes and preferences of the literary establishment
and whether those preferences correspond to general tastes and
preferences.212 Realizing that potential requires analytical tools and capabilities and
access to digitized texts.
And yet, today’s digital-minded literary scholar is shackled in time. In the
absence of a policy allowing non-expressive use of copyrighted material,
literary scholars, historians, and other humanists are all destined to become
nineteenth-centuryists: slaves not to history, but to the public domain. To do
their work thoroughly and completely—to study literary history, cultural
history, and the human record writ large—these scholars simply must have
access to the source material of literary, cultural, and human history. This
history does not and should not end in 1923.213
One of the aims of this Article is to disentangle the library digitization
issue for the purposes of data analysis from the broader orphan works
debate. There is no orphan works problem for library digitization-search
because the copyright owners are not implicated by digitization for the
purpose of non-expressive use. The distinction between expressive and nonexpressive works is already well recognized in copyright law as the gatekeeper
to copyright protection. As this Article has shown, the same distinction
should generally be made in relation to potential acts of infringement.
Preserving the functional force of the idea-expression distinction in the
digital context requires courts to conclude that copying for purely nonexpressive purposes, such as the automated extraction of data, are not
infringing. Like transformative uses, such as parody and criticism, nonexpressive uses should generally be classified as fair use because, by their very
nature, they do not substitute for the author’s original expression.
The legal status of actual copying for non-expressive uses was not a
burning issue before digital technology. Outside the context of reading
machines like search engines, plagiarism software, and the like, courts have
quite reasonably presumed that every copy of an expressive work is for an
expressive or consumptive purpose. The issue is now, however, squarely
before the courts and should be addressed. To apply the words of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Sony v. Connectix in a different context, “[courts]
are called upon once again to apply the principles of copyright law to [the use
of] computers . . . , to determine what must be protected as expression and
what must be made accessible to the public . . . .”214

212. See JOCKERS, supra note 116.
213. Id.
214. Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 2000).
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The idea-expression distinction protects the author’s legitimate interest in
her work while guaranteeing others the breathing space to supplement, reuse,
or reinterpret the facts and ideas embodied in the work. A similar distinction
should be applied to enable the non-expressive use of copyrighted works in
the age of reading machines, even if those machines reproduce the text as a
step in the analytical process.
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APPENDIX
An unauthorized word cloud illustration of the relative frequency of
words in this Article, as depicted below, would not infringe the rights of the
copyright owner of this Article.
Figure 6: A Word Cloud Based on this Article215

215. Matthew Sag, Orphan Works as Grist for the Data Mill, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1503
2012). Word cloud produced using Wordle.net. WORDLE, http://www.wordle.net/ (last
visited June 30, 2012)

